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TAUHIDUL ANWAR KHAN'

Management and Sharing of the
Ganges
ABSTRACT
The Ganges river, flows through the most populous areas of the
northeasternand eastern parts of the south asian region. Its basin is
spread over China, India, Nepal and Bangladesh. The flow of the
Ganges is highly seasonal. Floods during the monsoon seasons and
scarcity of water during the dry seasons are the two extreme flow
characteristicsof the Ganges. India and Bangladesh had been locked
in a dispute over the sharing of dry season flows of the Ganges for
more than 20 years. Discussions and negotiations between the
Governments of Bangladesh and India, have not provided a lasting
solution to the problem till 1995. It is a tragedy that the people
living in the Ganges basin areaare still one of the poorest despite the
basin's rich endowments. While so much could have been done,
management and sharing of the water resources of the Ganges
through positive riparian cooperation had been practically nil. A
significant amount of the monsoon floods of the Ganges which cause
widespread damages to lives and properties in the co-basin countries
could be conserved in the upstream storagesites to mitigate the flood
intensities downstream. The storage reservoirs would have
augmented the dry season flows of the Ganges and significantly
satisfied the reasonable water needs of all concerned. In addition,
generation of large amounts of hydropower from the storage dams
could have eased the energy crisis in the basin area and created more
job opportunities through facilitating rapid industrialization in
different parts of the basin. Instead of following the path of
cooperationtowards realizationof the bounties of the Ganges for the
benefit of the millions, the governments in the past became locked in
controversies. Progress towards mutual cooperation had been
impeded by mistrust, fears, misperceptions and myths. In 1996, new
governments came to power through democratic process in both
India and Bangladesh. Sincere and intense efforts by both the new
governments ultimately resulted in the signing of a thirty year
treaty between Bangladesh and India on sharing of the Ganges
waters at Farakka in December, 1996. The signing of this treaty
removed the major irritant and create a climate of trust and

* Joint Commissioner of the Joint Rivers Commission, Bangladesh. The views and
opinions expressed in this paper are the author's only.
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confidence congenialfor furthercooperation.In the interest of all, the
political and conceptual problems need to be more purposefully
addressedby all concerned, specially as the underlying commonality
of interests in the Ganges is overwhelming.
I. THE RIVER GANGES AND ITS BASIN
This Section briefly describes the general features of the Ganges
river and its basin including geographical and hydrological aspects. It
touches upon the status of development of Ganges water resources in
different co-basin countries and also provides a glimpse of the energy
scene in the basin area.
General Features
The Ganges ranks among the top ten large rivers of the world in
terms of annual run-off.' Rising in the Gangotri glacier at about 23,000 feet
on the southern slopes of the Himalayas in India, the Ganges flows through
the northeastern and eastern part of the south asian region. The Gangotri's
melt water stream is a full fledged river even as it emerges from the subglacial tunnel at the glacier terminus, the holy Gaumukh (cow's mouth) of
Hindu mythology. The Gangotri is considered to be the main source of the
Ganges. The Yamuna, Ramganga, Gomti, Kosi, Karnali, Gandaki and
Bagmati are important tributaries of the Ganges. The basin of the Ganges
spreads over China, India, Nepal and Bangladesh.
Eleven miles below Farakka (India), the Ganges enters
Bangladesh and joins the Brahmaputra near Aricha (Figure-I). The
combined flows meet the Meghna river before the rivers empty into the
Bay of Bengal. The total length of the Ganges from source to outfall is
1,570 miles.' The Ganges basin is one of the most densely populated
areas of the world. In the Bangladesh portion of the basin, the population
density is 1,917 per square mile.3 The estimated population of the Ganges
basin is about 405 million including 346 million of India, 19 million of
Nepal4 and about 40 million of Bangladesh (according to Bangladesh
estimate). The total basin area of the Ganges is 423,938 square miles.5

1. K. L. Rao, India's Water Wealth, ORmM LONGmAN LIMIIE 52 (New Delhi 1979).
2. G. R. Choudhury & Tauhidul A. Khan, Developing the Ganges Basin, in RR
BASIN DEVELOPMENT 29 (M. Zaman ed., 1983).
3. See BANGLADESH BUREAU OF STATISTICS, STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF BANGLADESH
(14th ed. 1993).
4. HARNEssiNG THE EAsrN HIMALAYAN RIVERS 15 (. G. Verghese & R. Iyer

Ramaswamy eds., Konark Publishers Pvt. Ltd. New Delhi, 1993).
5. Id. at 6.
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The surface water availability of the Ganges on an annual basis
is about 446 million acre feet (maf)and about 21 maf during the dry
season (January to May) at Farakka. 6 The three trans-Himalayan
tributaries, the Karnali, Sapt Kosi, and Sapt Gandaki emanating from
Nepal, provide 71 percent of the dry season flows and 41 percent of the
annual flows of the Ganges at Farakka' Floods during monsoon seasons
and scarcity of water during dry seasons are the two extreme flow
characteristics of the Ganges. The total availability of the Ganges at
Farakka during peak monsoon floods often touches 2,500,000 cubic feet
per second (cusec) mark, while during the driest months (March-April)
total availability at Farakka ranges between 55 and 65 thousand cusec (at
75 percent availability). 8
Flood in the Ganges is almost an annual phenomenon which
causes extensive damage to crops, properties, and lives in all the co-basin
countries. The population pressure in Bangladesh is greater and the
occupation of the flood plains more intense than in India and Nepal in
the Ganges basin. Thus, flood damage and distress is significantly higher
in Bangladesh, which is also subject to periodic Cyclones.
The Ganges basin is among the poorest and most depressed in
the world, a cruel paradox in the face of its rich natural endowments of
land, water and people. The area has most of the resources that make for
agricultural abundance and prosperity but the agricultural population
living therein, particularly in Bangladesh, is extremely poor.
Status of Water Resources Development in the Basin
For most of its length, the Ganges flows through India which has
been developing its surface water irrigation projects in the Ganges basin
area for more than a century. The British ushered in the modem period
of water resources development in India.
Renovation of the Western and Eastern Yamuna Canals was the
first enterprise of British military engineers and they were reopened in
1820 and 1830, respectively. The upper Ganges Canal was completed in
1854, irrigating 1.2 million acres through 2,298 miles of canals and
distributaries. The Lower Ganges Canal was undertaken in 1868 and
completed in 1878. Many storage works and canals were taken up in the
Bundelkhand area. In Bihar, the Sone canal was completed in 1879 and
the Tribeni canal on the Gandak by 1914. The Sarda Canal system in U.P.

6. See JOINT RPIV COMMISSIONS [hereinafter JRC] (Bangladesh).
7. Id.
8. Id.
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was constructed between 1915 and 1926. 9 During all these years, the
British colonial rulers, however, did nothing in terms of irrigation or
water resources development in the lowest reach of the basin, then called
East Bengal. The area remained grossly neglected in every respect.
In August 1947, British India was partitioned and there emerged
two independent nations, India and Pakistan. Most of erstwhile East
Bengal constituted the eastern province of Pakistan, called East Pakistan.
Since its independence, India made repeated efforts to harness and
develop the water resources in the Ganges basin. Information indicates
that India now has several dozen large barrages and other diversion
structures operating in the basin which are capable of diverting about
100,000 cusec flows from the Ganges and its different tributaries."
Moreover, India constructed about 200 major, medium and small storage
dams in the basin area. Of these, the 51 major storage reservoirs have a
total storage capacity of fifty-one maf." During the same period, the
pace of water resources development in East Pakistan was extremely
slow. The economic disparity between the Eastern and Western provinces
of Pakistan widened with the passage of years. The dream of the East
Pakistani farmers living in the Gangetic delta for an agricultural
revolution through development of water resources of the Ganges
remained unfulfilled. In the 1960s, responding to popular demands, the
government of Pakistan, however, implemented a medium sized
irrigation project called the Ganges-Kobadak (G-K) irrigation project. This
project, located downstream of Hardinge Bridge, pumps water from the
Ganges for irrigating about 200,000 acres in the greater district of Kushtia.
After a bloody war of liberation, East Pakistan gained
independence from Pakistan and a new country, Bangladesh, was born
in 1971. Until 1995 Bangladesh could not embark upon any major
development of Ganges waters in the face of uncertainities of its dry
season availability from across the border.
Nepal is another co-basin country of the Ganges. It has limited
financial resources for harnessing the water resources of the tributaries of
the Ganges emanating from Nepal. Over the past decades, a few projects
have been undertaken in Nepal under bilateral agreements with India.
Status of Energy Development in the Basin
The energy economy of the Ganges basin countries is highly
dependent on non-commercial fuels especially in Nepal and Bangladesh.

9. Verghese & Ramaswamy, supra note 4, at 43-44.
10. JRC, supra note 6.
11. Id.
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This is itself an index of a low level of economic development. There are
also a number of other implications. Reliance on dung and agricultural
residues for energy is depriving the soil of valuable organic manure while
the growing demand for firewood is degrading and destroying forests and
other green cover.
Even though India has been rapidly expanding its supplies and use
of commercial forms of energy, noncommercial and traditional forms of
energy continue to dominate the Indian energy scene. Fuelwood alone
accounts for 65 percent of the total non commercial energy consumed in
India.12 The biomass energy in Bangladesh is used predominantly by rural
households in the domestic sector. In Nepal, commercial energy sources
account for only 4.3 percent of the total primary energy consumption, the
remaining 95.7 percent coming from fuel wood, crop residues, and dung.13
A number of studies indicate that if the current uncontrolled and
unregulated exploitation of forest resources in Nepal is not stopped, the
forest resources of Nepal might soon totally disappear."
Coal, oil, and hydropower are the major sources of commercial
energy supply in India, with nuclear power playing a more limited role.
Nepal primarily depends on hydropower. Bangladesh's power supplies are
based on indigenous gas, imported fuel oil and a single hydel project. The
proven gas reserves of Bangladesh are inadequate to meet the country's
rising energy needs for very long. Considering the increasing demand of
energy, it may well be assumed that the basin area will face an acute energy
crisis soon, particularly in Bangladesh and Nepal. Moreover, if the current
practice of overusing the biomass as an energy source is not altered the
whole basin might soon be standing on the verge of an ecological disaster.
I. DISPUTE OVER THE GANGES AND HISTORY OF
NEGOTIATIONS
This section briefly provides the background of the dispute between
Bangladeshand India over the development and sharingof the Ganges including
the historyof negotiationson the Ganges,firstbetween India and Pakistanduring
the period of 1960 to 1970 and then between India and Bangladesh from early
1970s till the end of 1996.
The Dispute

The dispute over the Ganges arose out of an Indian decision to
build a barrage across the Ganges at Farakka, 11 miles upstream of the
12. Verghese & Ramaswamy, supra note 4, at 100.
13. Id. at 100.
14. Id.
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Bangladesh border. The stated purpose of the barrage was to divert water
into the Hooghly river to improve the navigability of the port of Calcutta
in the Indian state of West Bengal.
Chronology of Events: Pre-BangladeshPeriod
On October 29, 1951 the then Pakistan government drew the
attention of the Indian authorities to reports of a scheme for diverting large
amounts of dry season flow of the Ganges to resuscitate the BaghirathiHooghly river along which the Port of Calcutta is situated. Four months
later, on March 8, 1952 India replied that the project was only under
preliminary investigation and 5described Pakistan's concern over probable
effects as purely hypothetical.
On May 8, 1952 Pakistan quoted press reports that India was
engaged in a multipurpose scheme envisaging the resuscitation of not one,
but five, rivers in West Bengal, and a published technical report saying
large quantities of water from the Gandak, a tributary of the Ganges, was
being diverted for irrigation in Bihar, Uttar Pradesh (of India) and Nepal,
which, together with the Ganges Barrage at Farakka would have ruinous
effects on East Pakistan (now Bangladesh). The Indian reply, sent a year
later on May 22,1953, reassured that the Farakka and Gandak Projects were
still being investigated and India would appreciate cooperative
development of the water resources of the Ganges."
The first bilateral negotiation on the Ganges was held between
India and Pakistan from June 28 to July 3, 1960, nine years after the issue
was first mooted. In January of 1961, the Government of India announced
that it was going ahead with the plan to build a barrage across the River
Ganges at Farakka and Pakistan was formally informed." The actual
construction work of the Farakka barrage started immediately thereafter.
Talks took place occasionally between India and Pakistan, but real
negotiation and consultations did not. The Ministerial discussions
promised in the agreement in London in March of 1961 between the Indian
premier and Pakistani president did not occur." During much of the time,
India tried to maintain that the Ganges is not an international river. "To
have entered into negotiations with Pakistan would have been denial of
this line of argument" mentioned one researcher."' India did agree to some

15. GOvERNMENT oF THE PEOPLE'S REPuLIC OF BANGoADESH, WHITE PAPER ON THE
GANGEs WATER DISPUTE 11 (1976) [hereinafter GOB].
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. JRC, supra note 6.
19. BEr CROW r AL., SHARvG THE GANGES: THE POLmcs AND TEcHNOLOGY OF
RIVER DEvELOPMENT 84 (Dhaka, University Press Ltd. 1995).
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discussions and there were four technical exchanges in 1961, a fifth in 1968.
Five meetings were held at the Secretaries' level between 1968 and 1970. 2D
In the fourth Secretary level meeting, held at Islamabad in February of 1970,
the Pakistan delegation recorded the final position taken by them regarding
all the technical issues. The delegation stressed the futility of further
discussion of these issues except in the context of agreed allocation of water
from the Ganges to East Pakistan.2 1 By 1970 India completed construction
of the Farakka Barrage. The 24 mile feeder canal was, however, not ready.
Post-BangladeshPeriod
Bangladesh came into being in 1971. The governments of India and
Bangladesh decided in March of 1972 to set up the Indo-Bangladesh Joint
Rivers Commission (JRC). The statute of the JRC was signed eight months
later in November of 1972. One of the major functions of the JRC was to
maintain liaison between the participating countries in order to ensure the
most effective joint efforts in maximizing the benefits from common river
systems to both the countries.' The question of sharing the water of the
Ganges was, however, kept out of the purview of the JRC, to be settled at
the level of prime ministers.
The prime ministers of India and Bangladesh met in New Delhi in
May of 1974 and discussed amongst others, the Ganges issue. Following
this meeting there was a Joint Declaration on May 16,1974, wherein they
observed that during the periods of minimum flow in the Ganges, there
might not be enough water and, therefore, the fair weather flow of the
Ganges in the lean months would have to be augmented to meet the needs
of Calcutta port and the full requirements of Bangladesh. They also agreed
that the best means of augmentation through optimum utilization of the
water resources of the region available to the two countries should be
studied by the Joint Rivers Commission. The two sides expressed their
determination that before the Farakka project is commissioned they would
arrive at a mutually acceptable allocation of the water available during the
periods of minimum flow in the Ganges.'
The JRC accordingly took up the issue of augmentation of the
Ganges flows but was unable to reach any agreement. First the
Bangladesh side in the JRC suggested storage of monsoon flow in the
Ganges Basin in India and Nepal to augment the fair weather flow of the

20. GOB, supra note 15, Table 1.
21. Id. at 13.
22. Statute of the Indo-Bangladesh Joint Rivers Commission (Nov. 24, 1972).
23. Indo-Bangladesh Joint Declaration of the Prime Ministers of India and
Bangladesh, May 16, 1974, paras. 17-18 [hereinafter Joint Declaration).

Summner 1996]

MANAGEMENT AND SHARING OF THE GANGES

Ganges in the lean months.' However, the Indian side rejected the
suggestion stating that additional storage possibilities in India were
limited. To depend on storage as a means for augmentation of the Ganges
flows in the lower reaches for the optimum development of water
resources of the region was not realistic. The Indian side rejected outright
the question of considering development in Nepal because this was
outside the scope of the JRC. On the other hand, India contended that in
the Brahmaputra system in India, storages appeared feasible and could
be developed as and when the need arose. The Brahmaputra-Ganges link
held prospects of benefits to both the countries and fitted with the
concept of optimum development of the region.'
In response, Bangladesh stated that requirements of the situation
did not warrant transfer of water from the Brahmaputra into the Ganges.
It suggested consideration of amending the pattern of diversion of the
Ganges water into the Hooghly to meet the shortage in the Ganges in
lean periods and also referred to the scheme of improving navigation by
the construction of a navigation link from Calcutta port to the sea via
Sunderban.7
But again the Indian side rejected these suggestions. The
delegation contended that amending the pattern of diversion into the
Hooghly was beyond the scope of the JRC. Furthermore, the proposal of
constructing a separate navigation canal was not connected with the
question of optimum development of the water resources of the region.
A number of such and other proposals in the past had been considered
and found unfeasible. Thus the JRC failed to reach any agreed conclusion
on the subject.
A minister-level meeting between Bangladesh and India held in
New Dehli in February 1975 also could not produce any agreement. At a
subsequent minister level meeting in April of 1975 the Indian side proposed
that as discussions regarding allocation of fair weather flows of the Ganges
during lean months in terms of the Prime Ministers' Declaration of May of
1974 were continuing, India would like to make a test-run of the feeder
canal of the Farakka Barrage for a limited period during that dry season.
On good faith, Bangladesh agreed to India's request and allowed her to
operate the feeder canal with varying discharges (11,000 to 16,000 cusec) in
ten-day periods from April 21 to May 31,1975, ensuring the continuance of
the remaining flows to Bangladesh.'
Although India was supposed to divert limited quantities of water
from the Ganges for the said test-run up to May 31, 1975, it continued
24.
25.
26.
27.

GOB, supra note 15, at 15.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 16.
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withdrawals from Farakka to the full capacity of the feeder canal during the
entire dry season of 1976 without entering into any understanding or
agreement on sharing the flows despite Bangladesh's repeated protests.
The consequences of India's actions have been tragic. The unilateral
Indian withdrawals throughout the dry season of 1976 caused a marked
reduction in the dry season Ganges flows in Bangladesh. At one stage in
April of 1976, the flows amounted to only 23,200 cusec at Hardinge Bridge
(flow measurement station in Bangladesh) compared to the normal preFarakka flows of about 70,000 cusec.r This sudden change in the flow
pattern caused an alarming situation in the south western region of
Bangladesh.
In view of the seriousness of the situation Bangladesh repeatedly
requested India to stop the unilateral withdrawals and come to a sharing
agreement. But all these requests were fruitless. Having no other option
Bangladesh took the issue to the United Nations in November of 1976. The
Special Political Committee of the 31st Session of the UN General Assembly
approved a consensus statement at its 27th meeting on November 25,1976.
The statement reads: 'both parties agreed that situation called for an urgent
solution and to this end the parties have decided to meet urgently in Dhaka
at Ministerial level for negotiations with a view to arriving at a fair and
expeditious settlement." The statement further added, "it is open to either
party to report to the General Assembly at the thirty-second session on the
progress achieved in the settlement of the problem"."
In response to the UN statement, Bangladesh and India entered
into more discussion. After several rounds of talks, the two sides signed an
Agreement on November 5,1977 for sharing the dry season (January I to
May 31) flows of the Ganges available at Farakka for a period of five years
(1978-1982) according to a schedule which allocated roughly 60 percent of
the Ganges flows available at Farakka to Bangladesh. The agreement
provided that in case of exceptionally low flows at Farakka, Bangladesh
will be guaranteed at least 80 percent of its scheduled share for the
concerned ten-day period.3' This is popularly termed the Guarantee
Clause of the 1977 Agreement.
The 1977 Agreement also provided that the Indo-Bangladesh JRC
would make an agreed recommendation for augmenting the dry season

28. JRC, supra note 6.
29. Consensus Statement, U.N. GAOR Special Political Comm., 31st Sess., 27th mtg.,
U.N. Doc. A/SPC/31/7 (1976).
30. Agreement Between the Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh and
the Government of the Republic of India on Sharing of the Ganges Waters at Farakka
and Augmenting its Flows, November 5, 1977 [hereinafter Agreement Between
Bangladesh and India].
31. Id.
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flows of the Ganges at Farakka within a period of three years.'
Accordingly, Bangladesh made a proposal for augmenting the dry season
Ganges flows by conserving monsoon flows in the upstream regions of the
Ganges basin through construction of storage reservoirs in India and Nepal.
India, on the other hand, proposed a mega-size link canal cutting through
Bangladesh territory to transfer 100,000 cusec of waters from the
Brahmaputra (another international river emanating from the northern
slopes of the Himalayas and entering Bangladesh after flowing through
China and India) to the Ganges during dry season.' Eight meetings of the
JRC were held between January of 1978 and September of 1980 but no
agreement for augmenting the dry season Ganges flows was reached. Up
to February of 1980, the commission could not proceed because India raised
prima facie objections to including Nepal in the study of the Bangladesh
proposal.'
The agreement for sharing the dry season flows of the Ganges at
Farakka, expired on May 31, 1982. India rejected the Bangladesh proposal
for extension of the Agreement period despite a provision for such
extension in the 1977 Agreement?' However, by October of 1982, the two
countries signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) for sharing the
flows of the Ganges during the dry seasons of 1983 and 1984.0 This time
the Guarantee Clause of 1977 was replaced by a burden sharing
arrangement. The MOU also stipulated an eighteen month deadline for
completing the pre-feasibility study and decide upon the optimum solution
to the problem of augmenting the dry season flows at Farakka. 37
Accordingly Bangladesh and India updated and exchanged their proposals
on augmentation in 1983. The Bangladesh proposal focused on harnessing
the water resources of the Ganges basin through seven storage reservoirs
in Nepal38 (See Figure-2). The Indian proposal again envisaged transfer of
100,000 cusec of dry season Brahmaputra waters to Farakka through the
200 mile Brahmputra-Ganges Link Cana? (See Figure-2). The two sides
then exchanged comments on each other's proposal in February of 1984.

32. Id.

33. Indian Proposal on Augmentation of the Dry Season Flows of the Ganga at
Farakka (1978).
34. JRC, supra note 6.

35. Id.
36. Indo-Bangladesh Memorandum of Understanding, October 7,1982 [hereinafter

MOU].
37. Id.
38. GOVERNMENT OF TH PsoLe'S REPBLIC OF BANGLADESH, UPDATED BANGLADESH
PROSAL FOR AUGMEZTrAnON OF THE DRY SEAsON FLOWS OF THE GANGEs AT FARAxKA

(1983).
39. GOVERNmENT oF INA, UPDATED INDLN PROPOSAL FOR AUGMEI.rNG DRY
SEASON Rows OF TmE GANGA AT FARAKKA, (1983).

466
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After several rounds of discussions between December of 1982 and March
of 1984, the JRC on March 3, 1984 reported, "Inview of the difference of
views on each others proposal it was not possible for the Indo-Bangladesh
Joint Rivers Commission to make a recommendation which was acceptable
to each other in regard to the optimum solution for augmentation of the dry
season flows of the Ganges at Farakka".
As a result there was a deadlock in the negotiations. The dry
season of 1985 went without any sharing at Farakka. In the face of
unilateral Indian withdrawal from Farakka, the flow of the Ganges at
Hardinge Bridge was drastically reduced. To address the situation, the
heads of governments discussed the issue when they met at Nassau,
Bahamas in October of 1985 during the meeting of the Commonwealth
Heads of Governments. Subsequently, an accord reached between them.
Accordingly the two countries signed another MOU on November 22,
1985 for sharing the flows of the Ganges during the dry seasons of 198688. As in the 1982 MOU, the 1985 MOU omitted the Guarantee Clause
safeguarding the Bangladesh interests in case of exceptionally low flows
at Farakka. The 1985 MOU, too, provided that an Indo-Bangladesh Joint
Committee of Experts (ICE) would undertake studies to work out a longterm scheme or schemes for augmentation of flows of the Ganges at
Farakka within a period of twelve months. 4' However, in subsequent
negotiations the JCE discussed the same old proposals on augmentation
over a period of 24 months (with two six monthly extensions beyond the
original mandate of 12 months) and again failed to arrive at an agreed
scheme as each side stuck to its original stand.
The tenure of sharing arrangements under the 1985 MOU expired
on May 31, 1988. Since then, there has been no instrument for sharing the
dry season Ganges flows between the two countries. In the absence of
any agreement, India again started unilateral withdrawals from Farakka,
drastically reducing the dry season Ganges flows in Bangladesh. Table 1
provides a comparative picture of dry season Ganges flow availabilities
at Hardinge Bridge in Bangladesh covering pre-Farakka period and
different post-Farakka periods. The table shows that the flow of the
Ganges at Hardinge Bridge from March 21 to 31 in the pre-Farakka years
averaged 75,000 cusec. The table indicates that under sharing
arrangements, as per the 1977 Agreement, the flow was reduced to an
average of 41,239 cusec during 1978-82. With sharing according to the
MOUs of 1982 and 1985, the average flow of the Ganges at Hardinge
Bridge for the said ten day period of March amounted to 32,360 cusec
during 1983-84 and 38,879 cusec during 1986-88. In the face of unilateral

40. JRC, supra note 6.

41. Indo-Bangladesh Memorandum of Understanding, New Delhi (Nov. 22, 1985).
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heavy upstream withdrawals by India since 1989, the flow of the Ganges
for the same ten day period was severely slashed and it averaged only
17,516 cusec in the years 1989-95. This caused a crisis situation in
Bangladesh.
A close look into the main elements of the 1977 Agreement and
the MOUs of 1982 and 1985 reveals that the sharing of Ganges flows
under these instruments was always contingent upon Bangladesh's
agreement to study the Indian scheme for augmentation of flows at
Farakka. In all the negotiations since 1975 Bangladesh had tried to keep
the issue of flow sharing free of all conditions. Having all the advantages
in its favor, India, however refused this position.
Since 1989, Bangladesh has urged India to settle the problem of
sharing the Ganges flows on a long term/permanent basis, delinking it
from the issue, of augmentation. The Secretaries of the Ministry of Water
Resources of the Governments of Bangladesh and India held five rounds
of discussions between June of 1990 and October of 1991.0 In the midst,
the Bangladesh Foreign Minister also discussed the issue with his Indian
counterpart in August of 1991. In all these discussions, India did not
budge from its stand that perceived water shortages in the Ganges be
replenished from Brahmaputra waters by suitable diversion structures.
In May of 1992 at New Delhi, the Prime Ministers of Bangladesh
and India directed their ministers to make renewed efforts for attaining
a settlement for equitable, long-term and comprehensive sharing of the
flows of the Ganges and other major rivers." Incidentally, there are 54
rivers which flow into Bangladesh from India. The Prime Minister of
India assured that every possible effort would be made to avoid undue
hardships to Bangladesh by sharing the flows of the Ganges at Farakka
on an equitable basis.'
However, subsequent negotiations have been disappointing. The
prime ministers' meeting of 1992 was followed by one minister level and
two Secretary level meetings between the two countries, but again
without any positive result. The prime ministers discussed the issue in
April of 1993 at Dhaka, without any outcome. The negotiations on
sharing the Ganges was in a logjam despite the assurance of the Indian
Prime Minister not to cause undue hardship to Bangladesh. In order to
break the impasse, the Bangladesh prime minister once again took up the
issue during discussions with the Indian premier at New Delhi in May
of 1995. This meeting was immediately followed by two rounds of
meetings between the foreign secretaries of the two governments at New
42.
43.
44.
45.

See JRC, supra note 6.
Id.
Indo-Bangladesh Joint Communique, New Delhi (May 28, 1992).
Id.
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Delhi. Bangladesh urged for a long-term sharing of the existing dry
season flows of the Ganges. Talks between the foreign secretaries were
again held at Dhaka in June of 1995. These also did not yield any result.
The two secretaries, however, agreed to reactivate the Indo-Bangladesh
Joint Rivers Commission, dormant since its 31st meeting held in June of
1990.*
During the first half of 1996 the governments in both India and
Bangladesh changed and new governments have come to power in b)oth
countries. Within days of its coming to power the new goernment of
Bangladesh launched allout efforts to settle the Ganges sharing issue with
India. As a result there were several rounds of intense negotiations
between the two governments during the period from July to December,
1996 at various levels. These negotiations culminated in the signing of the
"treaty between the government of the Republic of India and the
government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh on sharing of the
Ganges waters at Farakka." The treaty was signed by the prime minister
of India and Bangladesh at New Delhi, India on December 12,1996. The
treaty entered into force upon signatures and shall remain in force for a
period of 30 years and its shall be renewable on the basis of mutual
consent. The sharing arrangement (from January I to May 31, every year)
shall be reviewed by the two governments at five years interval or earlier
as required by either part.' This treaty is no doubt a great achievement
in the history of Indo-Bangladesh negotiations on the Ganges and has
removed a major irritant in the relations between the two neighboring
countries.
II. THE EFFICACY OF FARAKKA BARRAGE AND ITS IMPACT
ON BANGLADESH
Since 1975 when the Farakka Barragewas put into operation more than
20 years have passed. Has the barragebeen able to serve the stated purposefor
which it was built? What has been its impact on Bangladesh in the downstream
reaches? These are the issues examined in this section.
Efficacy of the Barrage
The Farakka Barrage was constructed by India to divert 40,000
cusec of dry season Ganges flows into the Bhagirathi-Hooghly river of
West Bengal to flush silts and to improve the navigability of the Port of
Calcutta. The efficacy of diversion of waters from the Ganges for flushing
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the silts of Hooghly had been questioned in the past by many, including
Indian experts. As early as 1963, Mr. Kapil Bhattacharya, an Indian
expert, opined that the proposed diversion from Farakka for five months
every year would only be a waste of the scarce dry season flows of the
Ganges. He maintained that 40,000 cusec of Ganges waters would not be
able to generate the same flushing momentum as the one created by the
flood discharges of Damodor-Rupnarayan rivers of West Bengal with
steeper slopes.4
About 650,000 cusec peak floods of Damodar at the Old
Anderson Weir near Rhondia flowing through Rupnarayan and other
channels used to flush the silts of the Hooghly into the Bay of Bengal.
The deterioration of the Hooghly in the reach of the port of Calcutta was
the consequence of engineering steps taken in the catchments of the
Bhagirathi-Hooghly and Damodor-Rupnarayan rivers. Construction of
dams by India at Maithon, Panchet and other places in the Damodar
Valley by the Damodor Valley Corporation (DVC) has choked the outfall
of the Bhagirathi-Hooghly-Rupnarayan system. Since the implementation
of DVC projects, the peak floods from the dammed rivers reduced to
250,000 cusec from the normal 650,000 cusec. 0 Reduced flooding
expedited the siltation process in the Hooghly and halved the carrying
capacity of the river.
In 1962, eminent international experts like A. T. Ippen and C. F.
Wicker, after careful study of the Farakka Barrage project, concluded that
the diversion of fresh water into the Hoogly River through construction
of Farakka Barrage would not contribute to the solution but was likely to
accentuate the serious shoaling problems in that river and to the
preservation of the port of Calcutta.' In spite of all these timely cautions
voiced by many, the Farakka Barrage was constructed and commissioned
by India. Twenty years have passed since then. Over all these years, India
has diverted dry season Ganges flows in the range of 30,000 and 4C,000
cusec into the Hooghly form Farakka. l During the years when there
was no sharing agreement between India and Bangladesh, India took full
advantag and made diversions from Farakka exceeding 40,000 cusec.
Incidentally, the feeder canal of Farakka Barrage can actually divert up
to 45,000 cusec. The navigability of the port of Calcutta, however, did
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not improve. The relevant depth charts available with the Calcutta port
Authorities would bear testimony to this fact.3
India herself probably recognised that Calcutta, a port of the past
generation, could no longer meet the needs of modem shipping because
of its inadequate facilities. That is why it decided to set up a modern
deep sea port at a further downstream location called Haldia (about 60
miles below Calcutta) to cater to the needs of modem day large ocean
going vessels. The port of Haldia, today, is bustling with activities and
handling increasing amounts of cargo while the cargo handling by the
port of Calcutta is rapidly declining. In a seminar held in Calcutta in
December of 1981 the Regional Director of the Shipping Corporation of
India Ltd. stated in his address, "Haldia was thus born as a child of
necessity bridging, as it were, the generation gap of Calcutta.""
According to a senior hydrologist of Calcutta Port Trust, an
unhindered flow of 40,000 cusec during the dry months, which came in
between 1975 and 1977, could not prevent formation of fresh mounds of
underwater silt at the mouth downstream of the port. This obstruction,
known as the Balari Bar, had already restricted the draught of the
incoming ships to 31 feet even though the port was designed for vessels
with 40 feet draught. Based on this fact, one of the experts said "Farakka
or no Farakka, Calcutta Port is doomed" (Ref. "India Today", New Delhi,
February 16-28, 1981). An article which appeared in the Indian
newspaper "TheTelegraph" of Calcutta on July 2, 1993, commented,
[Ilt is time the authorities acknowledged Calcutta port is
doomed to extinction. The Calcutta port is 120 miles up the
river. It needs to face the grim truth that it has outlived its
utility. Sustaining it is a gross waste of scarce resources. Talks
of restoring the port to its former glory are pipedreams.
Haldia is close to the sea. No major sandbar needs to be
negotiated to reach it. If the funds presently wasted on the
Calcutta port were spent to deepen Haldia's approach channel
and expand its docks it would be a worthy successor to
Calcutta port.
The Impact of Farakka on Bangladesh
Two decades have passed since the Farakka Barrage was put into
operation. The diversions from this barrage to the Hooghly, however,
have not made any noticeable improvement.of the condition of Calcutta
port. But the Barrage certainly did wreak havoc on Bangladesh. Large
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scale Indian withdrawals of dry season flows of the Ganges have
produced ruinous impacts in every sphere of life and living in the
Ganges dependent areas of this country. Today, the flow of the Ganges
in Bangladesh, turns almost to trickles during dry seasons in the vast
expanse of the river bed. The phenomenon has adversely affected the
hydrology, river morphology, agriculture, domestic and municipal water
supply, fishery, forestry, industry, navigation, public health and
biodiversity. The deprivation of Bangladesh of its rightful share of the
Ganges flows denied it an annual benefit of about 600 million U.S.
Dollars in the agriculture sector alone. Initial asessment of only direct
damages in different sectors due to Farakka withdrawals indicate
Bangladesh damages to be worth three billion U.S. Dollars." This
estimate of only direct damages, however, is also preliminary and would
rise further after the final accounting. The delicate ecological balance of
the Ganges dependent areas of Bangladesh can tolerate only a certain
amount of rough handling. The continuous and increased assault of the
Farakka barrage on the environment and ecology is rapidly exhausting
the area's capacity to recover.
Alarming degradation of the environment of the Ganges
dependent areas in Bangladesh has already forced hundreds of people to
leave in quest of survival. In the face of deteriorating human health,
reduced economic productivity and loss of amenities,,life and living in
this part of Bangladesh is becoming increasingly vulnerable and insecure.
The diversion of the dry season Ganges flows from Farakka by
India was stated to be for the improvement of navigability of the port of
Calcutta. This was a new use against the existing uses in Bangladesh
which has no viable alternative to replace or supplement the deprivation
of natural flows of the Ganges. If measured by the original purpose of
improving the navigability of the Calcutta port, injection of thousands of
cusec of dry season Ganges flows from Farakka into the Hooghly has not
proved to be fruitful.
IV. THE ISSUE OF AUGMENTATION OF GANGES FLOWS AT
FARAKKA
The issue of augmentation of the dry season Ganges flows at Farakka
had been the major hurdle blocking meaningful progress of Indo-Bangladesh
negotiations on the Ganges in the past. This section briefly deals with the
proposals of India and Bangladesh for augmenting the flows of the Ganges at
Farakka.
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According to 1977 agreement the dry season flow of the Ganges
available at Farakka, the point of sharing between India and Bangladesh,
during the driest period (April 21-30) is only 55000 cusec (on the basis
of 75 percent availability). This flow is no doubt inadequate to meet the
demands of Bangladesh and the port of Calcutta. It may, however, be
noted that the dry season Ganges flow available at Farakka is only the
residual flow that remains after upstream uses in the Indian states of
Rajsthan, Haryana, Madhya Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh and Bihar. Experts
estimate that the total dry season flow of the Ganges in the upstream
reaches of India is more than 200,000 cusec.5 With increasing upstream
uses, the downstream flow of the Ganges is gradually depleting, putting
tremendous stress on Bangladesh. Ironically when Bangladesh does not
need any water during the monsoon, it is flooded with water, causing
loss of properties and lives. In fact, Bangladesh has to give passage to the
entire flood flows of the Ganges rushing down from a vast catchment of
more than 400,000 square miles. On the other hand, during the dry
season, when the country is in frantic need of water, there is acute
scarcity of flow in the river. In the interest of millions of people such a
situation argues for abatement. An urgent need exists not only to restore
the dry season pre-Farakka flows of the Ganges in Bangladesh, but also
to augment the flows.
Over the years Bangladesh and India have been talking about the
issue of augmentation without any fruitful result. India has stuck to its
position that the Ganges flows at Farakka can be augmented only
through importation of dry season Brahmaputra flows. Although India
has been talking on Brahmaputra-Ganges inter-basin transfer since 1974,
it tabled the formal proposal in 1978.17 The Indian proposal on
augmentation (See Figure-2) included:
-

-

a barrage across the Brahmaputra at Jogighopa in the
State of Assam of India and a link canal about half a
mile wide, 30 feet deep and 200 miles long (78 miles of
which will be through Bangladesh territory) taking off
from Jogighopa Barrage for diverting 100,000 cusec of
dry season Brahmaputra waters to the Ganges in the
pond upstream of the Farakka Barrage in India.
three storage reservoirs, one each on the rivers Dihang
and Subansiri (tributaries of the Brahmaputra) in the
State of Arunachal of India to augment the flows of the
Brahmaputra and one on the Barak (headstream of the
Meghna river of Bangladesh) river at Tipaimukh in
Mizoram/Manipur of India.
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This proposal was updated by India in 1983 wherein it was stated
that the component of the Jogighopa Barrage and the Link Canal would
be built in the first stage while the storage reservoirs would be
implemented in subsequent phases.
Bangladesh also updated its proposal and exchanged it with
India. Following exchange of the updated proposals, each country also
exchanged comments on each other's proposal in 1983. After detailed
examination of the Indian Link-canal proposal, Bangladesh informed
India that:
-

-

-

the total lean season demand of Brahmaputra waters by
Bangladesh surpasses the average dry season availability
of this river in the country. There is, therefore, no
surplus water available in the Brahmaputra during the
dry season for transfer elsewhere.
the feasibility of the proposed Brahmaputra - Ganges link
canal from Jogighopa in Assam to Farakka in West
Bengal is seriously discounted on several grounds:
It envisages construction of a gravity canal against the
lay of terrain contrary to the natural flow of the rivers.
Such a canal would totally disrupt the natural drainage
system of the area.?
It predicates construction of what would be the world's
largest canal, with a capacity of 100,000 cusec. The canal
would be substantially below the water table of a
potentially good aquifer, crossing 14 rivers with highly
seasonal discharge and high sediment concentration, in
an area characterized by fluvial instability.6

The economic consequences of the Indian proposal are even more
far-reaching. The Brahmaputra basin encompasses a large area and
population of Bangladesh. The negative impact on agricultural and
industrial productivity, irrigation, power, forestry and fishery is sufficient
to threaten the present and future economic development of the entire
basin, since this river, too, would be left almost dry during the dry
season after the transfer of 100,000 cusec from its flows.6'
For construction of the canal length inside Bangladesh, about
30,000 acres of land needs to be acquired. A vast area of about 593,000
acres will have to be considered lost as a result of water logging after the
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project is implemented. The canal, proposal, therefore, would be an
economic and cultural disaster. It would lead directly and indirectly to
the displacement of more than a million people, depriving them of their
land, home and hearth and would create a grave rehabilitation
problem.6 Bangladesh is a land-hungry country with one of the lowest
land to man ratios in the world. In Bangladesh, per capita availability of
cultivated land was only 0.22 acres in 1991. About 90 percent of the
people are dependent on land for their livelihood. The link canal would
also disrupt communications and truncate the land with no clear
appreciation of the potential adverse impacts on the hydrological,
geological or geomorphologic consequences on the region.
In the issue of augmentation of Brahmaputra flows by storage
dams in Dihang and Subansiri, a study undertaken by the Assam
Institute of Development Studies of India concluded ( as published in the
tAssam Tribune' from Guahati, State of Assam, India on July 22, 1981):
The storage prospect of Brahmaputra are not encouraging. Out
of the average annual yields of 420 MAF of the Brahmaputra
basin, a total storage of 30 MAF i. e. only 7 percent of the total
can be created even overstepping the reservations voiced by
the geologists and seismologists on many of the dams. The
above approximations have closely tallied with the estimation
of Dr. K. L. Rao (an eminent Water Resources Engineer and
Ex-Minister of Water Resources of the Government of India)
who stated that barely 10 percent of the Brahmaputra waters
are usable. Incidentally, of the total catchment area of the
Brahmaputra at Guahati (India), 69 percent is in Tibet (China).
As against the Indian proposal of inter-basin transfer for
augmentation of Ganges flows, Bangladesh has all along been stressing
the need for optimum development of surface water resources of the
Ganges basin through a coordinated basin plan undertaken jointly by the
co-basin countries-Bangladesh, India and Nepal. Through this plan, the
dry season Ganges flows can be augmented to the required level to meet
the water demands of the co-basin countries. Bangladesh discussed the
concept first in the tenth meeting of the JRC held in September of 1974.'6
In 1978, Bangladesh formally tabled its proposal for augmenting
the dry season Ganges flows through storage dams in Nepal and India.
India maintained that storage possibilities in the Ganges in India were
limited. Most of the storages had already been built or were being built
and their waters were being used or would be used. The rest were
distributed over wide areas and at far off distances from Farakka.
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Therefore, possibilities of augmentation through storages were low.
Bangladesh disagreed saying that there was enough water in the Ganges
basin on an annual basis. Proper development and utilization of this
water could meet the needs of the two countries. Bangladesh had
suggested that the Ganges tributaries coming from Nepal, which
contribute a substantial part of the Ganges flow, could be developed for
the benefit of the countries concerned.
Bangladesh, in its updated proposal for augmentation stated that
flow regulation of the four largest Nepalese catchments by constructing
seven storage dams at Chisapani, Kaligandaki (1 and 2), Trisulganga, Seti,
Sapt Kosi and Pancheswar (See Figure-2) would facilitate augmentation
of the dry season Ganges flows at Farakka by an amount of 58,500
cusec." It was proposed that if out of the stated seven dams, four at
Chisapani, Trisulganga, Seti, and Sapt Kosi were raised to natural limits
(imposed by either storage limitations or the water availability for extra
storage), then the dry season flows of the Ganges at Farakka could be
augmented by 188,500 cusec during the period January to May.(6
Restricting the number of storage dams to only seven, despite numerous
sites being available in Nepal, would cause minimal interference with
nature and create less rehabitational problems. Studies indicated that the
additional area of inundation due to raising of the four dam heights
would be far less than the amount of land which would go under water
if new dams were constructed for the same amount of augmentation.
Besides augmenting the dry season Ganges flows at Farakka, the storage
dams in Nepal would bring in other benefits like:
flood mitigation in the Ganges basin;
improvement of navigation in the basin area;
control of saline intrusion in the lower Gangetic delta;
control of pollution by increasing fresh water supply;
generation of large quantities of cheap hydropower in
Nepal. The total installed capacity of the proposed seven
Nepalese dams would be 11,500 MW; 42,700 GWh/yr
firm energy (ninety five percent dependable) and at least
17,000 GWh/yr secondary energy."
Unfortunately, the Bangladesh proposal for storage dams in
Nepal was not considered because India objected to the involvement of
a third country (Nepal) in the bilateral negotiations between India and
Bangladesh. This India did, despite the fact that in the Side letters
(integral part of the 1977 Agreement) were exchanged between the
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Governments of India and Bangladesh on November 5, 1977, the
Government of India committed as follows:
In the course of the discussions which have taken place between
us in connection with the conclusion of the Agreement between
Bangladesh and India on the sharing of the Ganges waters at Farakka and
on augmenting its flows, the two Governments have reached an
understanding to the effect that the words "proposed or to be proposed
by either Government", occurring in Article IX in part B of the
Agreement, relate to any scheme or schemes which may have been
proposed or may be proposed by Bangladesh or India do not exclude any
scheme or schemes for building storages in the upper reaches of the
Ganges in Nepal. The two Governments have also agreed to take such
further steps as may be necessary for the investigation and study of any
scheme or schemes.'
Over all these years, whenever Bangladesh wanted involvement
of Nepal in the discussion on its proposal for augmentation through
storages in Nepal, India had avoided the issue on the plea of bilaterlism.
Meanwhile India itself went ahead with negotiations with Nepal to
harness the Nepalese tributaries of the Ganges under Indo-Nepal joint
venture. During December of 1991 and October of 1992 the Governments
of India and Nepal entered into Agreements to jointly undertake the
following storage dam projects in Nepal:B
-

Karnali-Chisapani multipurpose project;
Pancheswar multipurpose project;
Sapt Kosi high dam projec;
Buni Gandaki projec.

In today's world, there is no dispute that the water resources of
international rivers are to be shared equitably among the riparian
countries. Isolated individual development cannot yield optimal results.
Development should be holistic. To that end, regional cooperation is
essential. A problem which is multilateral cannot be resolved bilaterally.
According to many, a number of social, political and historical inhibitions
had been at work obstructing meaningful regional cooperation in
management and sharing of common water resources of the Ganges. The
integrated development of this common resource remained neglected
with inadequate appreciation of the fact that every year lost meant the
loss of a productive multiplier through the creation of wealth and
employment that would otherwise have been at work.
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A significant amount of the monsoon floods of the Ganges which
cause widespread damage to lives and property in the co-basin countries
could be conserved in the upstream storage sites to mitigate the flood
intensities downstream. This, in turn, would have enabled augmentation
of the dry season flows of Ganges available at Farakka to satisfy the
reasonable water needs of all concerned. In addition, generation of large
amounts of hydropower from the storage dams could have eased the
energy crisis in the basin area and created more job opportunities by
facilitating rapid industrialisation in different parts. The tremendous
pressure on fuelwood in the region as an energy source would also have
been reduced and forest resources of Nepal in particular could also have
been saved. All these, however, did not occur.
The management of a river basin like that of the Ganges is a
matter of regional concern because it is a transboundary environmental
resource. Environmental degradation in one country is bound to
ultimately affect the other co-basin countries in some way or another. As
such when the environment of one country is adversely impacted, others
cannot and should not look the other way. It becomes the collective
obligation of all to tackle the situation and take remedial measures in a
concerted manner.
V. CONCLUSION
Water of the Ganges is too precious a resource to waste when
there are millions of poor people dependent on it for their livelihood. It
is a tragedy that the people living in the Ganges basin area are still one
of the poorest despite the basin's rich endowments. While so much could
have been done, achievement in terms of management of the water
resources of the Ganges through multilateral cooperation has been
practically nil. The potential of the basin is by now fairly well understood
by all. While the path of positive riparian cooperation should have been
followed towards realisation of the bounty of the Ganges for the benefit
of the millions, controversies prevented agreement in the past. Progress
towards mutual cooperation had been impeded by mistrust, fear,
misperception and myth. In the interest of all, the political and conceptual
problems need to be more purposefully addressed especially as the
underlying commonality of interests in the Ganges is overwhelming. All
concerned should wriggle themselves free of their unenlightened and
misplaced national interests. The national interests of one cannot be the
sum of losses of the others. There cannot be -any alternative to beneficial
cooperation toward an enlightened path of positive riparian relations. The
December, 1996 treaty betweem Bangladesh and India on sharing the
waters of the Ganges is a great leap forward that would usher in a new
era of such positive riparian relations.

